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Abstract 
Standards, benchmarks, define modern life, but do they diminish the importance of diversity for progress? 
Arguably not, for diversity, or variety, is the essence of economic life in the sense of underlying choice; 
economic calculation gives numerical substance to how people make choices in their daily endeavours, 
either as consumers or entrepreneurs. How does variety/diversity takes shape in the realm of institutions 
and policy making? Is the range of choices open-ended? The last couple of decades has revealed an 
overwhelming offensive of the neo-liberal paradigm in terms of defining “best practices”. Even language 
was shaped accordingly with market reforms being seen in a quasi-single theoretical and policy 
framework. Are we heading towards increasing uniformity with regard to institutional and policy set ups, 
worldwide? An affirmative answer would underline the successful market based transformation of a series 
of command economies. Some convergence between institutional patterns in the USA and the EU 
economies might be alluded to in the same vein A supportive argument for this line of reasoning would 
be that what matters for individual achievement, in the end, are equal opportunities. But this argument 
can be turned around when debating the merits of various institutional set ups in terms of creating fair 
chances for people. A sceptical answer would highlight the mounting challenges which confront societies, 
whether rich and poor, and the international community in general—in spite of the high hopes of not 
long ago. The demise of the “New Economy”, the series of corporate scandals in wealthy economies and 
the subsequent recourse to new regulatory legislation, recurrent financial and currency crises throughout 
the world, the controversies surrounding the activity of IFIs, should compel “ideologues”, of all sorts, to 
be more humble in their prescriptions. This essay argues that there is substantial scope for institutional 
and policy diversity to operate as a means to foster economic development; that there might be a 
paradigmatic cycle in the dynamic of economic policies.  
JEL codes: B22, H4, H11, O20, O23, P50, P51   
keywords : diversity, variety, institutions, policy, development 
 
1.  Introduction 
Diversity, or variety, is the essence of economic life in the sense of underlying 
choice; economic calculation gives numerical substance to how people make choices in 
their daily endeavours, either as consumers or entrepreneurs2. As Lancaster pointed out 
variety has value in itself3, for we enjoy a wider range of choices instead of a smaller 
one. How does variety or diversity take shape in the realm of institutions and policy 
making? Is the range of choices open-ended? How does institution competition operate 
in the real world?  
The last couple of decades has revealed an overwhelming offensive of the neo-
liberal paradigm in terms of defining “best practice” and spreading the gospel of its 
policies throughout the world; this offensive was carried out by international financial 
                                                 
1 This is a slightly modified version of a paper presented at the EACES workshop on “Institutional and 
Policy Diversity”,  Debrecen, 3-4  November, 2003. A special issue of the Hungarian journal Competition 
publishes the proceedings of this workshop. The thoughts contained herein were aired at several 
previous meetings. Comments made by, Michael Keren, Jacques Pelkmans, Tsumeaki Sato, and Radu 
Vranceanu are highly appreciated. I bear sole responsibility for the content of the paper.  
2 As Rosen says, “Diversity is the stuff of economics”(2002, p.1). 
3 Lancaster (1979).  
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institutions (IFIs) as well. Even language was shaped accordingly, with market reforms 
being seen in a quasi-single theoretical and policy framework. Are we, in accordance 
with the logic of this paradigm, heading towards increasing worldwide uniformity with 
regard to institutional and policy set ups? An affirmative answer would underline the 
successful market based transformation of a series of command economies, some of 
which are going to join the European Union in 20044. Likewise, some convergence 
between institutional patterns in the USA and the EU economies might be alluded to in 
the same vein. A supportive argument for this line of reasoning could be that what 
matters for individual achievement, in the end, are equal opportunities. But this 
argument can be turned around when debating the merits of various institutional set ups 
in terms of creating fair chances for people.  
A sceptical answer would highlight the mounting challenges which confront 
societies, whether rich or poor, and the international community in general–in spite of 
the high hopes of not long ago. The demise of the “New Economy”, the almost 
metaphysical notion of the 90s, the corporate scandals on both sides of the Atlantic and 
the subsequent recourse to new regulatory legislation, recurrent financial and currency 
crises throughout the world (which evince major flaws of the international financial 
system), the controversies surrounding the activity of IFIs, should compel “ideologues”, 
of all sorts, to be more humble in their prescriptions. In this context one can mention 
the partial counter-offensive represented by the so-called “Third Way” paradigm5, the 
new vigour found by neo-Keynesian ideas, the powerful insights of the “New 
Theories”, as Gilpin (2001) calls them, and last, but not least, the rising ambivalence 
triggered by unmanaged globalisation. 
This essay argues that there is substantial scope for institutional and policy 
diversity to operate as a means to foster economic development; that there might be 
paradigmatic cycle in the dynamic of economic policies.  
2.  What influences institutional and policy diversity? 
Institutional and policy diversity falls, arguably, under the impact of an array of 
factors and circumstances; some of these are enumerated briefly below. 
Institution and policy competition 
Competition rewards better performance, which is revealed at both micro- and 
macro-societal level
6. The adoption of best practices illustrates the power of better ideas 
and institutions. But best practices have their own dynamic and are shaped by local 
conditions, which further implies that institutions evolve over time–some decay, some 
advance, some transform themselves
7. 
Ideology 
Keynes remarked, once, that economists are intellectual prisoners of famous 
ideas. But ideas do not operate in a social vacuum. This is why, where democracy exists, 
it is not hard to detect linkages between the dynamic of political life (which is influenced 
                                                 
4 Albeit notable differences among reform policies have existed At the same time, China provides a 
glaring example of successful market based gradual transformation.  
5 The guru is Giddens (1998). The “new social democrats” talk about a worldwide political movement 
which should embrace their ideas. 
6 Although, some (like Krugman, 1994) would argue that nations do not compete; I still believe that 
nations, when seen as economic spaces (clusters of economic activities) compete. Otherwise, why would 
we care about national laws and norms and local networks? 
7 For an analysis of evolving institutions in capitalism see Olson (1982). See also North (1981).  
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by ideas/doctrines) and changes in economic policies. This is because the constellation 
of interests in society, which are articulated politically, drives policy formulation. When 
circumstances modify the texture of interests and entail also variations in the power 
(relevance) of ideas (some decay while others are resuscitated…) policies change and 
this can change institutions as well. 
Values (culture) and institutions 
Values influence individual and corporate behaviour, policies; they also modulate 
public intervention in the economy (society). Thence the debate on the merits and 
weaknesses of various brands of capitalism is not irrelevant
8. But whatever the cultural 
and social differences may be, people prize highly trust, honesty, loyalty. As  Arrow
9 said 
in a beautiful essay, these moral values have economic value, are basic institutions that 
oil the economic machinery and make it function better. 
Complexity  
Complexity does affect the ability of policy to influence economic outcomes. 
Undoubtedly, growing complexity magnified the costs of command-type planning in the 
former communist states and speeded up their collapse. Another example is provided by 
the European Union. Thus, the EU encounters mounting difficulties in its quest for 
institutional reforms (the Common Agricultural Policy included) due to its growing size 
and complexity. And it is clear that enlargement would not make this task easier. Japan 
achieved an economic miracle during the last century, especially after the second world 
war; her success was fuelled by an ingenious combination of market based economic 
structures and state intervention. Nonetheless, the increasing complexity and export 
orientation of the Japanese economy has entailed changes in its functioning and is 
forcing policy-makers to rethink their policy tools in order to cope with new policy 
dilemmas 
10(I refer here, in particular, to the decade long stagnation, and not, 
necessarily, to the consequences of the crisis in the banking system). And the late 
corporate scandals in the USA show the proliferation of conflicts of interest and the 
dangers of excessive market deregulation against the background of increasingly 
complex financial innovations
11. 
Economic openness  
The more open and smaller is an economy the more severely constrained is its 
national policy by external stimuli (phenomena). This is why open macroeconomics are 
quite different from macroeconomics in a relatively closed economy. Size matters 
considerably in explaining the intensity of transmitted effects, the power of 
interdependencies. 
International agreements 
International agreements operate as a constraining factor unless a country’s 
policy-makers obtain derogations, or enter into special arrangements with partners. 
Rules imposed by the functioning of economic and monetary blocs 
 For example, the EU accession countries have to comply with the so called 
Acquis Communautaire. However, there is room for bargaining and the EU itself should 
                                                 
8 In spite of convergence tendencies there are still important differences between American type and 
European type capitalisms. Asian capitalism has its own peculiar traits, and Latin-American economies 
also reveal specificities. 
9 Arrow (1974, p.23 ). 
10 For an excellent presentation of Japan’s current economic pains and travails see Gao (2001). 
11 One can see here some ill effects of the repeal of the Glass-Steagall legislation.  
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be interested in better policy venues, in view of its own reform pains and the need to 
help accession countries catch up economically. 
Policy conditionality  
In a world of growing interdependencies the effectiveness (performance) of 
policy making hinges on local expertise and the bargaining power of local negotiators in 
dealing with IFIs and other entities (such as the EU). Policy conditionality is to be 
linked to policy ownership. Lately, the IFIs have increased their concern for enhanced 
policy ownership, although, at times, this smacks more of a rhetorical exercise or an 
attempt to diffuse the responsibility for failed programs. 
Special circumstances   
Powerful adverse shocks force policy-makers to change their views and 
entrenched habits. Think about the rescue package mounted by the Republican 
Administration in the USA in order to help airlines companies (following the tragedy of 
September 11) together with the possibility (as voiced by Ben Bernanke, who is a 
member of the Board of the Fed) of combating deflation by buying T-bills; or the 
credits granted by the central bank of Brazil to firms which were badly affected by credit 
lines withdrawn by foreign banks (in late 2002), etc 
 
3.  An historical perspective 
 
3.1 The high age of policy diversity 
 
Institutional and policy variety was quite obvious in the aftermath of the second 
world war. I am not referring to the philosophical and practical underpinnings of 
command (communist systems). What I have in mind is the wide spectrum of views 
with regard to economic development, the macro-management of capitalist economy, 
trade policy arrangements, foreign exchange regimes for dealing with capital movements 
etc. One can argue that a national economy-centred view dominated policy-making, as 
against today's conception of a “borderless world” ( Ohmae, 1995). 
That was a period in which Keynesianism seemed to be hardly assailable in the 
realm of macroeconomic policy, structuralism got a high profile in relation with key 
problems afflicting developing countries, while the theory of the developmental state 
was embodied by Asian accomplishments. Trade policy, too, was used by various 
countries in order to acquire new competitive advantages, or protect domestic markets. 
There was much confidence in the regulatory power of the state and in its ability 
to make the economy (markets) function better, a vision which had roots in the Great 
Depression. This vision may have been reinforced by the tasks of post-war economic 
reconstruction and post-colonialism. But these policies were frequently abused during 
that period and wishful thinking often influenced policy-making. Arguably, this policy 
thrust did undermine the vigour of market forces.  
Nonetheless, the record showed positive results: there was economic 
reconstruction in Western Europe, a string of economic miracles in Asia, Brazil’s 
impressive economic growth in the 50’s and the 60’s (however fractured and skewed it 
may have been), etc.  
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3.2 The neo-liberal Zeitgeist of the last couple of decades 
I would submit that globalisation is driven by both technological and 
institutional (policy) factors. Therefore, it can be seen as a facet, too, of the neo-liberal 
offensive which started a couple of decades ago
12. But one should make a distinction 
between technological change (progress), which has economic and institutional 
consequences and which is, historically, of inscrutable vintage, and the range of policies 
initiated in the framework of wide-ranging financial and trade liberalisation, as well as of 
massive privatisation. 
During this period one meets the retreat of Keynesianism (against the 
background of rising inflation in several advanced economies and setbacks of profligate 
welfare policies) together with a belief in the preponderance of government failures in 
macro and micro-managing economies; market coordination failures are largely 
dismissed. Likewise, the poor record of economic progress in large areas of the world 
speeded up the sunset of development economics. As a matter of fact, mainstream 
(neoclassical) economics was seen as providing a valid toolbox for any circumstances. 
Thence emerged a policy framework, supported by the IFIs (the so called Washington 
Consensus), which supplanted the much wider conceptual policy approach of the 50s and 
the 60s. 
In the 80s there was much talk about a clash of models: the Anglo-American 
model vs. a so-called continental model, and an Asian model. Nonetheless, trade 
liberalisation, market deregulation and privatisation contained ideological fervour and 
were relentlessly pushed by the IFIs . The collapse of communism gave a further 
impetus to this vision and policy orientation.  
The complete independence of central banks, fiscal conservatism and neutrality, 
rejection of macro-management of the economy, downsizing of the public sector, and 
market deregulation were seen as epitomes of sound economics and policy, to be 
generalised worldwide. And globalisation supplied the world arena for thinking that 
there is “one way, and only one way” in order to achieve economic progress and, 
eventually, catching-up. 
The natural inference would be that policy diversity in policy-making is senseless 
in a world which appears to have discovered the ultimate best practices, either at the 
macro, or the micro level. 
 
4.  Examining the record  
There are numerous facts, which invalidate the rosy outlines of the picture 
sketched above and invite to intellectual soul searching and honest debate. 
4.1 The Washington Consensus  
The Washington Consensus
13 has often performed much below expectations, and 
there is a significant number of top notch economists who question some of its working 
                                                 
12 Soros, among others, calls it “market fundamentalism” (Soros, 2002). 
13 The Washington Consensus, as a name, was concocted by Williamson (1994), with reference to the essence 
of IMF and World Bank’s policies pursued in the last couple of decades.  
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hypotheses; some theoretical premises have been severely questioned
14 and the work of 
the IMF and the World Bank has come under fire
15.  
  Policies aimed at fostering growth in developing countries seem to have fared quite 
poorly, in many respects, in the last couple of decades, at a time of supposedly 
widespread application of the main tenets of the “Washington Consensus”. 
According to a foremost development economist, Easterly (who, for many years, 
was among the World Bank staff), during 1980-1998, average per capita income 
growth in developing countries was practically 0.0% (!), as compared to 2.5% during 
1960-1979
16. I would add that this discrepancy becomes even larger when singling 
out the economic performance of some Asian countries—which, as an increasing 
number of economists would concede, did pursue export orientation, but also 
implemented measures which, often, were at odds with the “orthodox” policies
17; 
these countries shaped their own, particular, strategies. As Easterly also points out, 
“the increase in world interest rates, the increased debt burden of developing 
countries, the growth slowdown in the industrial world, and skill-biased technical 
change may have contributed” to this stagnation
18. Easterly also stresses the inability 
of governments’ policies worldwide to make good use of incentives for growth. This 
state of affairs begs a simple question: Why is it so difficult to use incentives in order 
to foster sustained growth?
19 Easterly goes on, “We economists who work on poor 
countries should leave aside some of our past arrogance. The problem of making 
poor countries rich was much more difficult than we thought”.  
  Mainstream neoclassical theory has still to explain why divergence is so prevalent in 
the world economy
20. Moreover, endogenous growth models
21 and economic 
geography models have reinforced misgivings about the unqualified optimism on the 
distribution of benefits of free trade and free capital movements. Hence, a natural 
question arises: is opening (integration) to the outer economy advantageous, 
irrespective of circumstances? 
  Insufficient attention has been paid to the reality of asymmetries and informational 
problems in the functioning of both domestic and international markets, and to the 
                                                 
14 Stiglitz (1994, 2002) is the most notorious critic, and the list includes Krugman (1998), Sachs (1998), 
Bhagwati (1998) and others. 
15 James Wolfensohn himself has indicated that he is not insensitive to what is wrong with the World 
Bank.  
16 Easterly’s results seem to contradict one of the main conclusions of the World Bank’s Global 
Economic Prospects for Developing Countries 2001, which asserts that “Developing countries as a 
group enjoyed accelerated economic growth over the past decade…”(World Bank Policy and Research 
Bulletin, April-June 2001, p.1). It is fair to say, however, that Easterly refers to per capita income 
growth. 
17 These countries achieved macroeconomic stabilization via low budget deficits and tight monetary 
policies, but did nor refrain from targeting potential “winners”, through industrial and trade polices. A 
normal question arises whether such policies can be effective under the pressure of globalization and 
when public administration is weak, or captured by vested interests, as is the case in many transition 
economies. 
18 Easterly (2001a, 2001b). 
19 Op. cit., 2001, pp.291.  
20 See The World Bank’s Annual Conference on Development Economics, proceedings of 1999 and 2000 
meetings. As the World Bank economist Agenor put it, “the conventional neoclassical theory has 
proved incapable of explaining in a satisfactory manner the wide disparities in the rates of per capita 
output growth across countries” ( 2000, pp.392). 
21 Pioneered by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). Lucas (1988, pp.3-42) explains why divergence, instead 
of convergence, does happen.   
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key role of institutions. This is partially mirrored by the talk regarding “second-
generation reforms”, “good governance” and “reinvigorating the state’s capabilities”. 
But as  Rodrik remarked, “The bad news is that the operational implications of this 
for the design of development strategy are not that clear”, and “There are many 
different models of a mixed economy. The major challenge facing developing 
nations is to fashion their own particular brands of mixed economy”
22. In this 
respect, he stresses the key role of institutions of property rights, conflict 
management and law and order. This search for country-specific solutions does not 
clash with the need to use so called “best practices”, but one should equally 
acknowledge that “best practices” are not always clear. In this context, one has to 
give a fair hearing to Guillen, who argues that globalisation should not be 
understood as encouraging “convergence toward a single organizational pattern” 
and that ”organizational outcomes in the global economy are contingent on country-
specific trajectories”
23. The implication is that diversity does matter and does add 
value. The issue of asymmetries acquires particular salience in the international 
economy, where there is increasing disenchantment with the distribution of trade 
gains
24 and the functioning of financial markets. In this respect, one has to stress 
both the distribution aspect of trade (which relates to the rules of the game and to the 
way in which industrial countries defend their own markets
25), as well as the 
institutional dimension. 
  Prominent voices argue that the world community needs new arrangements, new 
institutions, which should be capable of addressing the problems of world 
governance
26. For instance, it is disconcerting to see that the efforts initiated in the 
field of financial markets reform, by the Financial Stability Forum, in 1998, subsided. 
As  Summers astutely pointed out, world integration demands financial integration, 
but, as the 20’ and the 30’s of the last century prove, recurrent financial crises can 
lead to world disintegration
27.  
4.2 Post-communist economic transition  
Post-communist economic transition has had very mixed results and the mantra of 
quick privatisation and liberalisation has clearly indicated its limits and over-simplicity. 
Under the term “the second wave of reforms” there has been an attempt to renew 
transformation economics by acknowledging the role of institutional change (and its 
consuming nature), the importance of competition and structures of governance (in the 
                                                 
22 Rodrik (2000b). He emphasizes five functions that public institutions must serve for markets to work 
properly: protection of property rights, market regulation, macroeconomic stabilization, social 
insurance, and conflict management. He also underlines that “there is in principle a large variety of 
institutional setups that could fulfill these functions”(2000, p.3) 
23 Guillen (2001). 
24 As the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2001 report says, 
“trade barriers in industrial countries represent a major roadblock for developing countries”(Ibid.., pp.2) 
25 The preparations for the Doha WTO conference were quite telling in this respect, with the USA, the 
EU and Japan having basically set the Agenda. The failure of the Cancun meeting (in October 2003) 
points at the same policy attitude. 
26 This is the message of Soros’ book (2002). Lord Dahrendorf is also very critical of the way in which the 
existing international institutions address these issues (for instance, in his lecture delivered at the New 
Europe College, Bucharest, October, 2001).  
27 Summers (2000, p.1).   
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public and the private sectors), the need of public goods (which cannot be supplied by 
the private sector), etc. 
4.3 The backlash against globalisation  
The backlash against globalisation is a stark reminder of the perils of succumbing to 
a simplistic economic cosmology. Growing economic gaps in the world
28, increasingly 
unstable financial markets and recurrent crises, the deterioration of the environment and 
the challenge of sustainable development in the world, spreading diseases, etc. have 
brought home many pieces of bad news. There is now talk of the need to manage 
(correct) globalisation and reform the international financial system. 
4.4 The “New Economy” 
The fading away of the myth of the “New Paradigm” and “the New Economy” in the 
USA, the spate of corporate scandals across the Atlantic
29 and the plunging bourses 
worldwide (during 2001-2002), the rocky recovery in the USA together with poor 
growth in the EU, are not without policy consequences. In the USA, the Bush 
Administration has resorted to a heavy dose of Keynesian economics in order to stem 
recession whereas the heavyweight economies in the EU are flouting the Stability Pact 
provisions on budget deficits. 
4.5 Preaching vs. practice  
The discrepancy between preaching and practice, particularly in the case of 
advanced economies
30, should give much food for thought, apart from its hypocritical 
undertones. 
 
5.  Where do we stand? 
5.1 Basic rules and contentious issues 
One can hardly question basic rules of the economic game, which underlie a 
sound functioning of economies. Such rules are:  
  free prices are essential for proper resource allocation; 
  there is need for clearly defined and protected property rights in order to foster 
entrepreneurship and commercial transactions; 
  hard budget constraints need to operate ubiquitously in order to have financial 
stability; 
  over the longer term low budget deficits are better than large ones;  
  money printing is bad for monetary stability,  
  outward-orientation of the economy is essential for making good use of comparative 
advantages 
                                                 
28 The 2002 annual report of the World Bank furthers the debate on the inadequacies of current policies 
for dealing with poverty reduction (Financial Times, 23 August, 2002) 
29 Following these scandals the Anglo-American model has lost some of its luster (see also Orts, “Law is 
never enough to guarantee fair practice”, Financial Times, 23 August, 2002) 
30 Think only about farm subsidies provided by both the USA and the EU and steel protectionism on the 
part of the USA.  
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These basic rules, however, do not extinguish the battle of paradigms and 
resulting advocated policies. Moreover, intellectual bigotry and doctrinal 
fundamentalism are detrimental to good policy-making, for the latter needs to be 
pragmatic and not skewed to vested interests.  
At the start of the new century the jury is still out on central issues, which have 
divided economists over the decades. This ambiguous reality and theoretical situation 
should trigger more candid debate in the places where policy is formulated or among 
those instances which advise governments. Let me single out some of these central 
issues, as they relate, particularly, to emerging economies. 
The macroeconomic policy-mix 
The Asian crises of the late 90’ have revealed the shortcomings of using budget 
retrenchment as the primary means for balance of payments adjustment at a time when 
the main source of high external indebtedness is the private sector. Likewise, overly 
restrictive monetary policies for supporting the local currencies proved to be quite 
damaging to the corporate and the banking sectors since they entailed lasting sharp rises 
in real interest rates, which accentuated adverse selection and, often, made things worse. 
For this reason some form of financial repression may be necessary in exceptional 
circumstances, as in the imposition of smart capital controls. These insights gain more 
salience against the backdrop of the revival of Keynesian-type policies in quite a few 
places (when inflation is very low, or deflation turns threatening).  
Trade 
Although free trade is deemed desirable by most economists (as a weapon of 
satisfying consumers and making good use of comparative advantages), the existence of 
big asymmetries and dynamic effects (including increasing returns in infant industries) 
provides a rationale for developing countries to seek some protection—in this respect 
some distinguish between free and fair trade. As Rodrik puts it, free trade is not always 
conducive to economic growth.31 One also has to stress here the discrepancy between 
what some rich countries preach and what they practice, for instance regarding trade in 
agricultural products, textiles and the like.  
Capital movements 
Free capital flows have been shown to be quite threatening for emerging 
markets, and the IMF no longer recommends capital account liberalisation (KAL) 
unless proper regulatory and institutional prerequisites exist. KAL was strongly 
recommended by the IMF to developing countries in the 90s, following the logic of free 
capital flows and the creation of a 'level  playing field' in a, supposedly, increasingly 
globalised world economy. It is fair to acknowledge that capital account liberalisation 
has exposed many institutional and policy weaknesses in various countries; but it is also 
correct—for those who advocated this policy drive—to acknowledge that KAL was, 
frequently, a mistake in view of the turbulence it caused in many countries and the 
contagion effects it entailed
32. Nowadays, the IMF admits, both explicitly and implicitly, 
this mistake when it links KAL with sound macroeconomic policy, proper institutions 
(including the banking/financial system) and solid prudential regulations.  
Exchange rate policy 
                                                 
31 Krugman and Helpman developed the concept of “strategic trade”, which is rooted in the behavior of 
large enterprises (1985). 
32 For an illuminating account of this issue see Eichengreen (2003). For the case of transition countries 
see  Daianu and Vranceanu (2003).  
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The financial debacle in Argentina and the demise of its currency board raise 
questions about another tenet of the late 90s (following the financial crises): that the 
corner solutions are inescapable exchange rate regimes in a world of free capital flows. 
Life shows again its complexity and the danger of oversimplifications. 
Provision of domestic public goods 
The role of government in dealing with market coordination failures is widely 
debated and it is acknowledged that there is scope for public intervention in the 
economy; the proliferation of financial and currency crises, gross irregularities in the 
functioning of other markets (energy trading, for example) are making a compelling case 
for strengthening regulatory frameworks and law enforcement by the state.
33 
Tax policy 
Fiscal neutrality can be deceptive in a world of huge asymmetries. Developed 
countries used a different level and structure of taxes when they were at a lower level of 
economic development. How does this fact bear on the suggestion—which some 
make—to use their current taxation systems as a model for tax reform in developing 
and transition countries? Several questions can be raised in this respect: a. which best 
practices does one have in mind? Can an economy leapfrog development stages by just 
trying to import through imitation foreign institutions? b. are best practices uniform all 
over the globe? c. might it not make better sense to look at the experience of those 
economies, be they very few, that scored remarkable economic progress during the last 
decades (the successful catching-up stories)? d. to what extent does globalisation and the 
rules and regulations of the international economic system (WTO, etc) allow an 
economy room for using fiscal devices with the aim of fostering growth—the case of 
Ireland is conspicuous in Western Europe; and the Visegrad group, which attracted 
most of the FDI by fiscal incentives as well, among transition countries. But one can 
broaden the discussion and look at Asian economies, too. The developmental challenge 
may be less relevant for the accession countries (albeit that they, themselves, have to 
close major gaps vis-à-vis the West), but it is certainly becoming of paramount 
importance for South-eastern Europe. The conventional wisdom and the advice 
provided by the IFIs stresses the need for fiscal neutrality. But how can the least 
distortionary effects of taxes be judged in a world in which there are numerous 
externalities, asymmetries, adverse external shocks, multiple equilibria, etc.? How can 
one deal most effectively with the frequency of second-best situations? And what are 
policy implications, in general, and for taxation, in particular?  
Policy conditionality  
Policy conditionality has already been mentioned as a high profile issue. The 
IFIs seem to be ambivalent in this respect; on one hand they seem to concede the need 
for allowing governments more room in formulating their own national policies; on the 
other hand, the IFIs have a hard time in devising new procedures to this end and, also, 
show a sort of organisational/intellectual inertia in absorbing new ideas. Thence comes 
out a major challenge for the IFIs when they are seen as a repository of knowledge and 
providers of sound advice. The IFIs would have to engage in a more candid debate on 
the policy challenges facing the developing world—the World Bank is, apparently, more 
open in this respect—and explore new policy venues by assimilating what Gilpin called 
“the new theories”. As a matter of fact, these new insights hook up with some of the 
main ideas of the classical development economics. 
                                                 
33 As Prof.  Sato argued at a Zagreb conference, the “market oriented regulatory state” gets an increasing 
profile nowadays.  
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International public goods 
Who is accountable for the provision of public goods in the world economy? 
Do the major economies have a moral and operational responsibility in this respect, 
including the coordination of various policies in order to avert bad equilibria? Most of 
the time the IFIs and officials of rich economies talk about the need of good 
governance in developing economies as a means to foster development and avert major 
crises. But what can small open economies do when confronted with large upswings in 
capital flows and other adverse external shocks? As some contend, big changes in the 
flow of international liquidity may bear the brunt of the responsibility for the financial 
crises in emerging economies than other causes.
34 
The role of IFIs 
What about the IFIs? Perfection does not exist in real life and criticism is part 
and parcel of what prods progress. This reality does apply to the activity of large 
organisations, including the IFIs; the latter are supposed to provide public goods to the 
world community and for this reason their endeavours are constantly examined by 
governments, NGOs and citizens at large in a world increasingly under the pressure of 
globalisation. The activity of IFIs has been surrounded by rising controversies starting 
with the late 90s. The recurrent worldwide financial and currency crises, the 
disappointments of trade liberalisation (particularly in developing countries)
35, the record 
of economic development in poor countries, the ambiguous effects of globalisation, 
have brought the IFIs more under the scrutiny of public debate in academic, policy and 
wider circles.  
The IFIs and other international organisations would have to come to grips with 
the issue of “global governance”; this involves their own operations as well as some 
substantive institutional reform, as in the case of the international financial system. But 
here one meets the vested interests of the main players in the international economic 
system, which may delay changes unless a major event (such as a major crisis) forces a 
radical shift in their policy propensity. 
5.2 Values, institutions and policy 
Lately, the issues of ethical behaviour and social responsibility of firms and 
individuals have come prominently to the forefront of public debate. Widespread 
corruption and unethical behaviour are primarily seen as features of institutional fragility 
and lack of democratic credentials, which are to be found in the developing world, in 
particular. Nevertheless, the recent spate of corporate scandals across the Atlantic and 
similar cases in the rich part of Europe illustrate a more complex reality. One should 
remember that a similar wave of scandals gripped the USA in the 80s. Is there a cyclical 
pattern in advanced economies, linked with unavoidable behavioural excesses during 
periods of exuberance, which would subside over time following policy and institutional 
adjustments? Or, can one establish institutional circumstances and peculiar policies 
which enhance unethical behaviour, and which do not automatically trigger adequate 
counter-acting responses. Can one link social and economic dynamics of capitalism to 
apparent shifts in some of the values which drive entrepreneurs’ behaviour? Is the profit 
motive similar to greed, to use Greenspan’s famous words, to “irrational exuberance”? 
                                                 
34 See Pettis (2001) and Desai (2003). 
35 The way rich economies have attempted to link trade issues with the so called Singapore issues (on 
investment policies) has also disappointed the developing world.  
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What is the role of norms (formal and informal) in constraining socially irresponsible 
behaviour? 
Post-communist transition is replete with cases of corruption and unethical 
behaviour. Their handy explanation would be the very institutional weakness of post-
communist societies, a precarious functioning of checks and balances and a corrupt 
judiciary together with very feeble law enforcement capacity. In an optimistic vein, the 
same reasoning would highlight the advance of structural and institutional reforms, 
which would allow these societies to diminish considerably malign (unethical) behaviour 
gradually. Joining the European Union can be seen through the lenses of this upbeat 
logic. A more broadly defined answer would look at the issue of governance in both the 
public and the private spheres and scrutinise lessons worldwide, both in rich and poor 
countries. Differently, a pessimistic answer would talk about a bad “path dependency” 
and point at the persistence of widespread corruption, precarious institutions and 
malfunctioning markets in large parts of the world. 
In transition societies the prospects of joining the EU has operated as a catalyst 
for reforms and a strong support for dealing with the pains and frustrations of social 
change. But quite a few citizens are disappointed by the results of reforms, and the 
widespread corruption and unethical behaviour incense most of the population; some 
citizens relate these phenomena to market reforms, and this perception shows up 
unabashedly in the polls. When the first wave of accession takes place benefits should 
accrue to many citizens, but disappointments, too, are likely to become more intense. 
Such likely outcomes beg a candid discussion on the linkage between values, morality 
and  the dynamic of capitalism and what it takes to make it more fulfilling for most of 
the population. This is why the public debate on effective regulations, law enforcement 
and institutions in general, which should strengthen the ability of markets to deliver for 
the satisfaction of most citizens as consumers and avoid massive social exclusion, has 
not lost its relevance. The scope of the state in providing public goods should be judged 
in the same vein, albeit this role should be judged in conjunction with the need for a 
streamlined and more efficient public sector, which should not crowd out or undermine 
the functioning of the private sector.  
The public debate on ethics and economy acquires new overtones when looking 
at the world under the impact of globalisation and other forces at work. Aside from 
international terrorism, one can point at the dark side of globalisation: the inability to 
cope with global issues (such as global warming), massive illegal immigration, increasing 
poverty in many areas of the world, poor functioning of international financial markets, 
etc. In this context, the issues of governance, both in the public and private spheres, get 
more salience. And governance cannot be dissociated from the values, mindsets of 
those who make decisions.  
The years following the Great Depression brought about new regulations, aimed 
at restraining excesses and unethical behaviour in markets’ functioning. An example was 
the Glass-Steagall Act in the USA, which split investment banking from commercial 
banking. The recent scandals in corporate America and on Wall Street raise questions on 
the wisdom of wide deregulation which occurred in the banking industry in the late 90s. 
Institutional adjustments followed the end of the Second World War as well. History 
seems to indicate a cycle of policies and institutional adjustments following large 
economic dynamics. It may be, that after the “deregulation euphoria” which featured so 
highly on the agenda of governments, especially, in the Anglo-Saxon world, during the 
last couple of decades, a new phase is about to set in; this phase would underline the  
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need for effective market regulations and a more enlightened working together between 
the public and the private sphere. This logic would have to apply also to the 
international economy, which needs public goods so badly, which in turn demand the 
reshaped international institutions capable of ensuring global governance. The latter, 
clearly, asks for more international cooperation and a common vision on how to tackle 
the major challenges confronting mankind. These challenges cannot be dealt with unless 
economic rationality blends with social and moral values
36, which should preserve the 
necessary social cement of societies.
37  
5.3 Reinterpreting Globalisation  
There can hardly be a concept in international life that has in recent years 
triggered more controversy than globalisation. Some, particularly in the rich countries, 
see in it a deus ex machina for doing away with misery and conflict in the world. Others, 
especially in the poor countries, see it at the roots of mounting tensions in the world. 
Why is it so? What lies behind this stark cognitive dissonance? There can be two ways to 
look at this dispute: one is to examine facts which, directly or indirectly, rightly or 
wrongly, are related to globalisation; another is to judge the concept itself, its very 
content. 
Facts give highly conflicting signals. Technological change has reduced 
transportation and transaction (information) costs and speeded up the transfer of know 
how, albeit in a highly skewed manner, among regions of the world; the internet 
connects instantaneously hundreds of millions of people; world trade has expanded 
tremendously and broadened the scope of choice for individuals throughout the world. 
The collapse of communism has expanded the work of market forces and democracy in 
a large area of the globe. And the very dynamic of the European Union can be seen as 
an alter ego of globalisation on a regional scale. But at the same time the distribution of 
wealth in the world seems to be more unequal nowadays than, let’s say, twenty years 
ago
38; the myth of the “new economy” has dissipated and corporate scandals in the 
affluent world shows that cronyism and bad governance are a more complex 
phenomenon that is usually assumed and ascribed geographically; financial and currency 
crises have been recurrent in emerging markets and have produced economic and social 
havoc in quite a few countries; trade liberalisation has favoured primarily rich countries, 
which, most of the time, preach what they do not practice; social fragmentation and 
exclusion have been rising both in rich and poor countries; there is sense of disorder 
and a rising tide of discontent and frustration in many parts of the world; non-
conventional threats, the use of mass destruction in particular, are looming menacingly.  
Arguably, to make sense of the facts is to look at the conceptual underpinnings 
of globalisation. And here there is an interpretation of globalisation that is pretty much 
overloaded ideologically. I refer to the paradigm which extols the virtues of unbridled 
markets, privatisation and extreme downsizing of the public sector and of state 
intervention in the economy; this philosophy widened to international markets—finance 
and trade—and, the IFIs had often championed it. This paradigm has retreated, 
                                                 
36 In order to “reinvent” capitalism, or its soul.( Greider, 2003). See also Bebear (2003). 
37 Lal talks about the importance of shame-based and guilt-based cement in explaining cultural traits of 
long run economic performance (1999, p.13). 
38 A former deputy managing director of the IMF and a leading macroeconomist, says that “The overall 
challenge to economic globalization is to make the global system deliver economic growth more 
consistently and more equitably (Fischer, 2003, pp.23)  
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somewhat, in recent years following disappointing economic performances around the 
world and the nefarious functioning of financial (and energy) markets; but its resilience 
is powerful and is visible even in how it shapes the language used by some media (I was 
always puzzled by the use made of the term “market-friendly”: is a neo-Keynesian a foe 
of the market economy?). 
I submit that globalisation can be understood in a different vein, which looks at 
the functioning of real markets—with their goods and bads—and which takes into 
account insights of advanced economic theory such as informational asymmetries, 
increasing returns (while technological progress is intense), agglomeration effects 
(clusters), multiple (bad) equilibria, the role of economic geography, etc. Thence come 
important lessons to the fore: the need for effective regulation of markets, the role of 
the state in providing public goods, the role of institutions (structures of governance); 
the need of public goods and good governance in the world economy, the importance 
of diversity and policy-ownership in policy-making, etc. To some, this interpretation 
may sow seeds of confusion. But, in this way, one can dispel a biased interpretation of 
globalisation. Moreover, globalisation would no longer be assigned an ideological 
mantra and one-sided policy implications. Instead, it would become an open-ended 
concept, which purports to define the mutual “opening” of societies, under the impetus 
of technological change and the many fold quest for economic progress. Moreover, it 
rids itself of a perceived western-world-centred origin. Such an unconstrained 
interpretation of globalisation would have major repercussions for national public 
policies and international politics. 
Thus, national public policies could be fairly pragmatic and varied, not 
succumbing to fundamentalism, and geared towards the traditional goals of economic 
growth, price stability, and social justice. Markets would have to be properly regulated 
and the state would have to provide essential public goods, which crowd in private 
output. As the rigged financial and energy markets in the USA have shown, these theses 
are valid for rich and poor countries alike. Rodrik aptly observed that there is no 
modern economy which does not blend the public and the private spheres. An inference 
would be that going to the extreme with privatisation can be more than deleterious, 
which is particularly valid in the case of public utilities. 
The international economy is replete with problems which beg adequate 
answers. Financial markets—under the pressure of volatile capital flows—function 
precariously, and the system needs repair. It appears that one of Keynes’ intellectual 
legacies, which is enshrined in the Bretton Woods arrangements, namely that highly 
volatile capital flows are inimical to trade and prosperity, has not lost relevance. Those 
who say that it is hard to fetter capital movements in our times make a strong point, but 
do not solve the issue. The volatility of financial flows imparts a deflationary bias to 
policies worldwide, enhances trade protectionism and competitive exchange rate 
devaluations. Ultimately, the international financial system would have to undergo 
substantive changes in order to avert lethal crises.  
Free trade cannot benefit poor countries when rich economies subsidise heavily 
their agriculture and use trade barriers whenever they feel like being “injured”; double 
talk and hypocrisy make a mockery of the virtues of free trade and give moral 
ammunition to advocates of fair trade. Likewise, the diminishing aid to the very poor 
countries is hard to justify when acknowledging the huge asymmetries in the world. And 
a keen sense of urgency and pragmatic vision would demand a different policy in order 
to deal with the threats of spreading epidemics, massive illegal migration, abject poverty,  
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and environmental disasters. Not to mention the scourge of international terrorism. All 
these challenges make up an agenda, which can be assumed by an enlightened 
interpretation of globalisation.  
 
5.4 Will development economics stage a comeback?  
Can the neo-liberal framework foster economic development, irrespective of 
circumstances? In certain respects it can, as is the case of stimulating entrepreneurship 
and fighting excessive welfare measures and central regulation. But, as some argue, this 
framework is far from sufficient in enabling policy-makers to deal with the complexity 
of development efforts in a world which is replete with asymmetries, market 
imperfections, and precarious equilibria 
Economists, nowadays, while underlining the pre-eminence of markets in 
resource allocation and of rewarding entrepreneurship, debate fiercely about the 
economic role of governments. This debate has been fuelled by theoretical insights 
brought about by “The New Theories”
39: the theory of multiple equilibria, which posits 
the possibility of persistent bad equilibria; the theory of endogenous growth, which 
undermines some basic constructs of neoclassical economics, such as “the law of 
diminishing returns”; the thesis of “path dependency”, i.e., the role of history, the 
importance of geography; the role of information costs and asymmetries, the 
importance of clusters for achieving competitive advantages
40, etc. 
“The New Theories” rely, or bring back to the limelight, theses of the old 
development economics. For Hirschman, Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse, Myrdal, 
Leibenstein, all of them highlighted the role of institutions, structural features of poor 
countries, which keep them hostage to various types of traps, the need for assistance, 
what Rosenstein-Rodan termed as the “Big Push” in a famous article written in 1943
41.  
To sum up: the current debate on development economics has rediscovered 
several of its old issues and, in this context, it re-emphasises the existence of 
externalities, multiple equilibria, bad path-dependencies, vicious circles and 
“underdevelopment traps”, all of which pose numerous challenges to public policy. For, 
it is increasingly obvious that public policy (at the national and the international level) 
has a role to play in order to address market coordination failures. This is because 
“There may be a social equilibrium in which forces are balanced in a way that is Pareto 
improving relative to one in which the government’s hands are completely tied— and 
certainly better than one in which the private sector’s hands are completely tied”
42. In 
this context, one needs to underline the importance of good institutions, of proper 
structures for public and corporate governance, which condition the overall 
performance of the economy.  
It is increasingly clear that the wide variety of economic performance in post-
communist transition countries has to be related to the different functioning of 
institutional set-ups and policy diversity. 
It may be that we are on the verge of a new age of development economics 
against the backdrop of the very disappointing record of economic advance in most of 
                                                 
39 Gilpin (2001). 
40 Porter (1990)’s use of clusters in explaining competitive advantages makes a link with Myrdal (1975)’s 
analysis of vicious circles in developing countries. 
41 Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). 
42 Karla Hoff (2000, pp.170).  
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the developing world (if one excludes China and parts of India), transition failures in 
many post-communist countries, and the backlash against globalisation. Blanchard, 
Krugman, Rodrik, Stiglitz, and others form a remarkable platoon of brilliant economists, 
who can inject more realism and creativity into development policy-making. 
6.  Transition economies and institutional and policy diversity 
6.1 Performance differences 
For most of the past decade, policy makers, in transition countries, have been 
concerned with the construction of the main building blocks of the new economic 
system. Institutional disarray (disorganization
43), and the effects of the collapse of the 
former COMECON trade area, brought about the first transformational recession and 
high inflation in the early 90s. Macroeconomic stabilization, privatisation, opening, 
formed their main policy thrust in the early years of transition. Figure 1 illustrates the 
collapse of output in these economies at the start of transition period.  
 
Fig. 1. Annual GDP growth rates in CEECs, % on previous year  
Country  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995  1996 1997 1998 1999  2000  2001
Bulgaria   -9.10  -8.40  -7.25  -1.48  1.82  2.86  -10.14 -6.94 3.50  2.51  5.8  5.0 
Czech  R. -1.22  -11.49 -3.29  0.57  3.21  6.36  3.91  0.98  -2.50 -0.21 3.1  3.5 
Estonia    -8.10  -10.01  -14.15  -8.51  -2.00 4.29  3.98  10.53 4.06  -1.39  6.9  4.7 
Hungary    -3.50 -11.90  -3.06 -0.58  2.95 1.50  1.34  4.57 5.07 4.27 5.2  3.8 
Latvia     2.90  -10.41  -34.86  -14.87 0.65  -0.81  3.34  8.61  3.56  0.47  6.6  7.5 
Lithuania  -3.30  -5.68  -21.26 -16.23 -9.77 3.29  4.71  7.28  5.15  -3.07 3.9  4.7 
Poland    -11.60  -7.00  2.63  3.80  5.20  7.01  6.05  6.85  4.80  4.04  4.0  1.1 
Romania    -5.58  -12.92 -8.77  1.53  3.93  7.14  3.95  -6.07 -5.43 -3.19 1.8  5.3 
Slovakia   -2.47  -14.57  -6.45  -3.70  4.90  6.91  6.58  6.54  4.42  1.90  2.2  3.1 
Slovenia  n.a  -9.0 -5.0 2.8  5.3 4.1 3.5  4.5 4.0 4.8 4.6 3.0 
Source: Based on Economic Survey of Europe, 2000, vol. 2, UN-ECE, Geneva; WIIW Research Report 283/2002 
 
But even so, one can easily discern a major difference between macroeconomic 
dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEECs) and in the Community of 
Independent States (CIS) countries. In Central and Eastern Europe, inflation was 
brought down much more rapidly and output recovery started earlier. What lies behind 
this difference? A World Bank study remarks that “while initial conditions are the 
dominant factor in explaining the output decline at the start of transition, the intensity 
of reform policies explains the variability in output recovery thereafter”
44. I would argue 
that initial conditions and geography played a major role throughout this period, and 
that bad path dependencies have evolved in the meantime.  
The above mentioned World Bank study highlights four major lessons of 
transition, namely:  
  the key role of the entry and growth of new firms (the strategy of encouragement 
and discipline);  
  the need to develop and strengthen legal and regulatory institutions;  
                                                 
43 Concept coined by Olivier Blanchard (1997) 
44 Pradeep Mitra and Marcelo Selowsky (2001).  
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  the need for more aggressive use of the budget during a reform program, in order to 
protect the most vulnerable social groups;  
  the recognition that initial winners may oppose later stage reforms.  
However, what seems to be underplayed in this enumeration, is the time 
consuming nature of institutional development, which is at the root of various path 
dependencies. In this regard, one needs to highlight the relationship between precarious 
institutions and the persistence of bad equilibria, which hamper long-term economic 
growth. Likewise, the World Bank study seems to underplay the very severe budget 
retrenchment in most transition economies, due to collapsing revenues, which badly 
impaired the ability to protect low income population against the pains of 
transformation. But not the whole of the CEEC area has had similar macroeconomic 
dynamics. A salient feature is the boom and bust dynamic of Romania and Bulgaria 
during the 90s; both countries have been undergoing economic recovery in recent years. 
Over time, and in conjunction with reform consolidation, new concerns have 
emerged for the CEECs. Thus, economic growth has become of paramount importance 
in the quest to join the European Union, and also, as a means to solve increasingly 
sensitive social difficulties—at a time of rising unemployment. The main features of 
economic dynamics in the CEECs, which have relevance for the debate on catching-up, 
are summarized below: 
  steady high growth rates have proved to be quite an elusive goal for CEECs; 
  in all CEECs, there have been substantial fluctuations of GDP growth rates, besides 
the impact of the first transformation recession.  
  moderate rather than high growth rates seem to be characteristic for the better 
performing CEECs;  
  boom and bust cycles did appear in a few cases, and this type of dynamics may 
appear again unless severe balance of payments crises are avoided. Arguably, for the 
countries which are likely to join the EU in the near future this danger would largely 
disappear. 
  saving and investment ratios are not impressive, whereas the inflows of FDI were 
concentrated in a few countries. 
  all CEECs trade extensively with the EU; for all of them, the EU is by far the largest 
trading partner. Arguably, therefore, output dynamics in the CEECs has benefited 
from increased openness and integration with the EU.  
  substantial inflows of FDI foster growth, but they need favourable accompanying 
circumstances;  
  persistent large current account deficits cause balance of payments crises and harm 
sustainable growth. 
The features highlighted above cast some doubt on the thesis that catching up is 
looming at the horizon, or that it is likely to happen as an automatic outcome of current 
policies
45. This inference should sober us, particularly in view of the kind of growth rates 
that CEECs need in order to catch up with the EU area. It may well be that what is 
realistic to achieve are more moderate rates of income per capita growth; however, even 
such moderate growth rates require heavy advances in structural and institutional 
reforms. Higher growth rates may occur if steady FDI flows are substantial (and profits 
are reinvested), investment ratios stay around 30%,  and there is constant upgrading of 
                                                 
45 For a thorough analysis of catching up prospects of transition economies see Kolodko (2002).   
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production. But, at the same time, the CEECs would have to avoid, as much as 
possible, adverse external shocks.  
Figure 2: Per capita income levels in Europe (1998, in PPP as % of EU average) 
Country Per  Capita 
income level
Country Per  Capita 
income level 
Greece   66  Latvia   27 
Ireland   101  Lithuania 31 
Bulgaria   23  Poland   36 
Czech Republic   59  Romania  27 
Estonia   37  Slovakia  46 
Hungary   49  Slovenia  68 
Source: “Progress Towards the Unification of Europe”, World Bank Report, 2000, p.40 
 6.2 The EU factor 
In the above context, a related question appears: are the current negotiations and 
the efforts to adopt the Acquis Communautaire the equivalent of an effective strategy for 
economic catching-up? In many domains, they may well be so, to the extent that good 
institutions are smoothly “imported” and function effectively, and to the extent that 
technology transfer and upgrading of production (via FDI) occur intensely, for the 
benefit of a majority of the citizens—and social cohesion is not impaired.  
The EU, as a phenomenon, is exceptional in an historical perspective; it is 
unique both economically and politically in modern history. This is why one can hardly 
establish an analogy between NAFTA and the agreements which the accession countries 
have with the EU. As a matter of fact, the accession countries see in the EU 
enlargement an historical chance to speed up their economic development and 
modernization. Can integration into the EU be viewed as a Grand Strategy for 
economic catching-up (beta-convergence) and modernization—for the “Big Push”, 
which most of CEECs have been seeking during the last century?
46 It is worthwhile 
reminding what Rosenstein-Rodan had in mind when he wrote his famous article in 
1943. In that article, he referred to key inter-dependencies in an economy, which may 
preclude its development, unless there is effective coordination among its constituent 
parts, its industries; development asks for complementary changes of action and 
resources. And such simultaneous endeavours may not be possible in the absence of a 
strong stimulus, of a “big push”. This is a crucial question to be addressed by policy 
makers.  
Central and Eastern European societies do not look poor in important respects 
(e.g. the literacy rate of the population and general educational standards, behavioural 
patterns), but most of them face a set of challenges, which are specific to poor 
countries: still fragile institutions, disturbing and growing inequality
47 (precarious social 
cohesion), incompetent political elites, endemic corruption that distorts and taxes 
business, etc. Therefore, these countries need to formulate policies, which should tackle 
problems that are typical to poor countries as well; they need development, i.e., 
catching-up strategies 
                                                 
46 Rosenstein-Rodan (1943, 1961). 
47 It should be acknowledged, nonetheless, that much of this growing inequality is unavoidable, as a 
result of the change from a command (highly equalitarian) to a market-based economic system.  
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Empirical analyses show that the opening of the economy and integration with 
the outside world have a better chance to foster economic growth when there is an 
intense inflow of foreign direct investment, which upgrades the capital stock and human 
capital of the recipient countries—while it does not crowd out domestic investment. It 
is no surprise, therefore, that the frontrunner accession countries have received a 
disproportionate share of FDI.  
Equally, a strategy of economic development and catching-up requires policy 
ownership, which refers to both domestic intellectual capabilities (expertise), as well as 
to the capacity to formulate policies. This is the lesson of the most impressive cases of 
catching-up of the last century (whether one thinks of Japan, South Korea, Singapore, 
and more recently, Ireland). It may be that the EU arrangements could supplant partially 
the need for domestic policy capabilities. But, as the reports of the European 
Commission consistently document, particularly in the case of the less performing 
accession countries, public administration reform is critical for development, which is a 
clear indication of the essential tasks of domestic policy. It is true, however, that, within 
the constraints of the institutional functioning of the EU, domestic policy formulation 
acquires a new connotation. But the problem remains, since Brussels cannot be a 
substitute for key decisions at the national level. 
Here is a caveat about the linkage between EU integration and convergence. 
Some of CEECs’ premises for catching-up may clash with the strict conditionality of the 
Maastricht Treaty criteria, in case the accession countries intend to join the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM2) and, later on, the Monetary Union. A related situation is 
entailed by the implications of the Balassa-Samuelson Effect, which may make it impossible 
for accession countries to comply with the requirement of a low inflation rate in order 
to fit the EU (ERM) area
48. And, should they try to attain a very low inflation rate, this 
may undermine growth and, therefore, catching-up. If this is the case, should some of 
the accession criteria be made more flexible?
49 How would the EU member countries 
view such a weakening of criteria? To what extent can the logic of a “variable geometry” 
play a role in this context? Would such a variable geometry process of enlargement be 
manageable?  
For the EU candidate countries, the low inflation criteria (and, further, the 
Maastricht Treaty provisions) and the negotiations with Brussels raise two main sets of 
questions: one regards trade links and, more specifically, the capacity of accession 
countries to withstand competitive pressures when trade protection asymmetries and 
other adjustment instruments disappear; the other issue regards the possibility for the 
candidate countries to accommodate the stern exigencies of a very low inflation 
environment, even if they do not adopt the single currency.  
It should be also highlighted that, against the backdrop of the vagaries of an 
increasingly uncertain world environment, the EU can provide a shelter, which should 
be seen in the context of attempts, worldwide, to form economic and monetary blocks.  
                                                 
48 Rosati (2001). See also Halpern and Wyplosz  (2001). 
49 One can make an analogy with the current debate on the adequacy of some of the provisions of the 
Stability Act of the European Union –the 3% budget deficit upper limit at a time of very slow growth in 
the Eurozone.   
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6.3. A few thoughts on South East Europe50 
The tragedy of September 11
th has reignited the debate on the linkage between 
poverty, social destitution and what breeds deep resentments, inter-ethnic conflicts, 
terrorism. Europe, too, is not devoid of dismaying events, with the Balkans’ last decade 
epitomizing much of what is evil in the contemporary world.  
What can puzzle an observer of the Western Balkans
51, in particular, is a visible 
clash of perceptions on the recent social, political and economic dynamics of this area. 
There has been, thus, a series of positive developments, which are hardly questionable 
and which do influence perceptions in an optimistic vein: wars and violent inter-ethnic 
clashes have stopped, region wide democratically organised elections have taken place, 
inflation was brought under control, and some economic recovery has lately occurred, 
to name just a few such developments. As a matter of fact, South East Europe, which 
includes the Western Balkans, overtook Central Europe in terms of GDP growth in 
2001 and 2002, and would do the same, apparently, in 2003. It would be foolish to 
underestimate these positive tendencies and not try to capitalise on them. On the other 
hand, it would be equally foolish to ignore the dark side of the story and the tensions 
which continue to strain the region. 
The Western Balkans, as a whole, are plagued by huge unemployment, which 
has reached about 40% of the entire active population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and over 
70% in Kosovo; this unemployment breeds the underground economy and criminality. 
There is an increasing addiction to foreign aid, which is of a debilitating sort to the 
extent that external assistance does not focus on the creation of viable economies and it 
finances mostly consumption. Migration of young and skilled labour is gathering pace, 
which is depleting the most valuable asset of the region. Low saving and investment 
ratios throughout the area indicate that current economic recovery has a low chance of 
turning into sustainable economic growth. In addition, the region is rife with organised 
crime and criminality in general, often reaching the upper layers of government. Many 
citizens are disappointed with the results of reforms and this shows up in the polls; 
there is growing apathy among the electorate and nationalistic parties are staging a 
comeback.  And not least, issues of constitution and status and continuing inter-ethnic 
strife could easily unleash new crises. Against this still very complicated background it 
does make sense to keep policy makers in the region and abroad alert to the danger of 
complacency and underestimation of what maintains the region as Europe’s hotbed. 
Some pundits are tempted to make an analogy with the end of the second world 
war in evaluating the Balkans. Even the putting forward of the idea of a new Marshall 
Plan for the region has a part of its justification in such an analogy. But one should be 
cautious in making such a comparison, in over-stretching the relevance of history. There 
are several motives in adopting a cautious approach. Firstly, at that time there was no 
process of state-formation and state dissolution and, thence, no ensuing conflicts; this 
fact favoured, within the stretch of a few years time, the start of the process of 
economic integration by the setting up of the Coal and Steel European Communities. 
Secondly, there was a clear distinction between victor and loser in the war, which did 
                                                 
50 For more on economic policy in the Balkans see also my paper (2001). I do not address herein Turkey’s 
situation, which is highly complex and overloaded with geopolitical content. 
51 This excludes Bulgaria and Romania, which were invited to start accession negotiations with EU and, at 
the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, were set 2007 as a possible time entry date.  
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not involve revision of borders.
52 This is not the case in the Western Balkans nowadays, 
where borders have been and still are questioned by some. Thirdly, the Marshall Plan 
meant, primarily, an infusion of funds for energizing economic reconstruction in an area 
which did possess the institutional ingredients of a market economy. This is clearly not 
the case with large parts of the Balkans, in spite of the decades of market experience of 
many of the inhabitants of the states, which previously made up Yugoslavia. Fourthly, 
there was, at that time, a big common enemy: communism, external and internal. Who 
is the big common enemy of the peoples in the Balkans, at the start of the new century? 
The prime candidate would be poverty, underdevelopment and criminality in an area 
which, yet, belongs to a prosperous Continent. But this is an imprecise enemy and not 
easy to deal with by looking at worldwide experience.  
Assistance is badly needed in the Balkans. But while it needs to be considerable, 
it should also be wisely calibrated and provided. Aid needs to take into account the 
complexity of intra-regional relations, the still murky political geography in parts of the 
region, the existence of latent conflicts, the prevalence of weak (sometimes failed) states, 
etc. This extremely complex situation links inextricably national economic objectives 
with other goals, such as peace and security. At the same time, the stability of the region 
as a whole can be viewed as a collective good, a public good for Europe.  
It should be said, however, that whereas goals can be easy to define in abstract 
terms (peace and security, social cohesion, economic growth, etc.) they are much harder 
to formulate and pursue practically—particularly when they imply hardly reconcilable 
objectives of governments which do not show a high propensity to cooperate, or when 
these goals have to be pursued under very adverse circumstances. In the western 
Balkans this situation is ubiquitous and explains the heavy presence of outsiders 
(including the provision of economic aid), the existence of protectorates, “hard” and 
“soft”. But foreign presence does not simplify the solution to problems automatically, as 
the experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina for instance amply indicates.   
Tackling the problems of South east Europe, of the Western Balkans in 
particular, demands a vision which should frame the policies of both domestic (local 
governments) and external actors. This vision and the ensuing policy need to consider: 
a. the consequences of the years of immense destruction brought about by military 
conflicts; b. the failures of reform efforts; and c. the still very complex nature of 
relations inside the region—all these in conjunction with a developmental challenge. For 
what is less talked about is the relative backwardness of the area when judged according 
to European benchmarks. For instance, the income par capita, in many parts of the 
Balkans, does not exceed 3,000 euro (measured at purchasing power parity), whereas the 
EU average is higher than 21,000 euro, and infrastructure is very inadequate. In this 
respect policy-makers and the aid agencies need to take into account main lessons of 
development experience and the insights of “the new theories”.   
A development focused policy needs to consider what is realistic to achieve 
without shunning bold action; it also needs to put the whole endeavour into a longer 
term timeframe, keeping in mind the intricacies of the situation on the ground. Policy-
makers would have to cast their endeavours under three major headings: crisis-
management; economic reconstruction; and the change of the economic regime 
(institutional change) without succumbing to policy fundamentalism. In this respect it 
can be said that dealing with the Western Balkans should be judged from two inter-
                                                 
52 Certainly, the division of Germany could be mentioned as a counterexample, but it does not change the 
thrust of the assertion.  
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related perspectives. One is the exercise of dual (short- and long-term) crisis-
management, which aims, inter alia, at arresting (reversing where it is possible) bad 
dynamics/path-dependencies. The late years in Macedonia are an obvious case of this 
type of crisis management The second perspective concerns development, which would 
have to be a two-pronged strategic endeavour: physical reconstruction (after  the years 
of military ravages); and development proper, that includes institutional change and the 
political process. In all of this aid has a critical role to play.  
The inherent difficulties of dealing with the unsolved and, often, seemingly 
intractable challenges posed by the Western Balkans, could be compounded by events 
taking place outside the region. One such event is the effort to deal with non-
conventional threats, which sets new priorities and redirects resources among the major 
outside players. The USA, for obvious reasons, is likely to reduce its military and 
material presence in the region, which would require an offsetting act on the part of the 
European Union which would have to increase its involvement accordingly. But this is 
not a clear option/solution at a time of major economic strain in Western Europe as 
well, and at a time when “the big game in town” seems to be EU enlargement. On this 
line of reasoning one points at another major event, which has a bearing on the concrete 
attention paid to the Western Balkans. It may be that economic pain in the West, 
combined with a less smooth unfolding of enlargement, could keep the region off the 
immediate radar screen of western chancelleries. This could undermine the attention 
paid by the EU to the region, its overall assistance, at a very sensitive period in time, 
when there is acute need to support the still very fragile local democracies and help 
economic reconstruction.  
7.   Concluding remarks 
The past decade has been suffused with claims that economic policy in the 
advanced countries is bring driven by an emerging new consensus on principles and 
practice. The ideological fallout was pretty obvious in Giddens’ concocted “The Third 
Way” syntagma, which connotes neither traditional social-democracy, nor blatant 
liberalism in the European sense; this formula was adopted by the “new” Labour Party 
in the UK as its quasi-philosophical mantra and other social democrats have tried to 
foray deeply into it. Highly glamorous seminars featuring Clinton, Blair, Schroeder, 
Persson, Jospin, and others were quite en vogue in the late 90s. In the United States 
George W. Bush used “compassionate conservatism” as an ideological slogan to 
enhance his presidential quest, which may have helped him in the end. It appeared as if 
Social-Democrats (in Europe) and Democrats (in the USA), on one hand, and right-
wing parties (in Europe) and Republicans (in the USA) were coming closer, in terms of 
both principles and practice of economic policy. 
The sources of this apparent “new” consensus are, arguably, several. One origin 
could be traced to Man's perpetual desire to control his environment (nature) and be 
more efficient. Thus, in the first quarter of the past century Max Weber’s 
“rationalisation of life” referred to rational accounting, rational law, rational technology, 
which by extrapolation, can be extended to “rational economics”, as a form of hard 
science. Later on (in the seventies), another famous sociologist, Daniel Bell (1973), upheld 
the primacy of knowledge and theory-related activities in ordering our life, man’s 
technological and economic ascendancy—which would imply that economic wizards 
can secure a fool-proof policy. Even the clash between Keynesianism and monetarism, 
the two main competing macro-economic paradigms, could be seen in the vein of  
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searching the ultimate piece of wisdom. Another origin of policy amalgamation comes 
out of the death of communism. Fukuyama’s “End of History” was seen by many an 
embodiment of the, presumably, single ideology (liberal democracy) which was meant to 
rule the world. Last, but not least, globalisation—as an incarnation of unfettered 
markets and downsizing of government, operating worldwide—also provided an 
impetus to the vision of the 'ideal type' of economic policy. 
At the start of the new century there are numerous examples which prove that 
conflicting ideas matter a lot, that reality cannot be encapsulated in a procrustean 
ideological bed; that economics continues to be softer than some of us try to make 
people believe. As far as policy is concerned, it is increasingly clear that trimming the 
welfare state and the public sector is not enough in order to achieve the expected 
efficiency gains; this endeavour needs to be accompanied by effective regulations of 
markets (financial and energy, for example), which, otherwise, can easily be rigged; “the 
new economy”, the “new paradigm” (which claimed to combine high growth rates with 
very low unemployment), proved to be, simply put, the mirage of the 90s. The 
developments of the last couple of years in the USA and elsewhere, offer ample proofs 
in this regard—which motivated public authorities to initiate the Oxley-Sarbanes Act. 
Likewise, as against the prevailing tenets of not many years ago, economic policy, as it is 
currently undertaken in the USA and Europe,  does not preclude running  larger budget 
deficits during a downswing of  the cycle; this is the explanation for some basic 
Keynesian recipes returning to the limelight. It should be said, nonetheless, that, while 
Keynesian macroeconomics seems to get a higher profile nowadays, the EU member 
countries are trying to make their markets (labour, production, services, financial) more 
flexible while government-empowered R&D programs are being pursued
53. 
How does globalisation fit into this picture? The pressure of more intense 
competition forces governments to streamline their public sectors, which does frustrate 
trade unions and many citizens, at large. But rich countries in the West remain welfare 
states par excellence, albeit in an evolving manner. One can detect here a rising/returning 
Keynesianism in macroeconomic policy-making with a retreat when it comes to social 
policy; there is an apparent policy contradiction herein. Another consequence of 
globalisation is the creation of an international policy agenda. By omission and 
commission, some of wealthy countries’ less inspired policies have given renewed high 
profile to issues such as: fair vs. free trade; dealing with abject poverty in the world; 
protecting the environment as a public good for mankind; the code of conduct for 
international corporations; how to manage contagion effects in the world economy; 
policy coordination among the leading economies of the world, etc. 
As a matter of fact, the traditional ongoing battle between left and right—within 
the framework of democratic politics—is being shifted, partially, into the international 
arena. The debate on global governance (which institutions and policies) reflects a 
growing awareness that there are issues which need to be addressed internationally, in a 
multilateral context and using collaborative approaches. Arguably, the choice between 
globalisation and “managed globalisation” is between accepting the effects of 
completely free markets, with total disregard for market failures and their social 
consequences, and trying to construct an international policy which should address and 
prevent massive coordination failures. The debate on which form of capitalism, and 
                                                 
53 According to the goals of the Lisbon Agenda.  
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what type of state intervention in the economy, turns, partially, into a debate on which 
form of “global capitalism”. 
The second policy route does make sense in a global economy, in which there is 
acceptance of the need for international public goods. Otherwise, under increasing 
pressures from foreign markets and other threats (including terrorism, illegal 
immigration, spreading diseases, etc), governments would resort to national means of 
protection—such as trade protectionism and trade clashes, competitive devaluations, 
etc.  
Ideology is not dead, and it does shape social and economic policies—although 
in subtler forms and following cyclical patterns. It may be less felt nationally to the 
extent the battlefield of ideas expands increasingly beyond national borders. In any case, 
globalisation is likely to reflect ever more the battle of ideas, with traditional politics 
delving increasingly into the international domain. How policy-makers address the hot 
issues in the international economy should provide clues regarding its dynamics. Moving 
away from doctrinal fundamentalism in policy-making would enhance the room for 
institutional and policy diversity. Having said that, I do not mean to say that 
governments should renege on basic rules of sound behaviour in economic policy-
making. Instead, I have in mind creative policy-making, which should shun policy 
fundamentalism and acknowledge particular circumstances. Clearly, “bad governance” 
in poor countries would have to be unswervingly fought against. The IFIs will have to 
be more candid about past and present failures in development policy and be faithful to 
the idea of policy ownership, which, it should be said, does not preclude policy 
conditionality  Likewise, rich countries’ governments should practice more what they 
preach in order to be more credible in their dialogue with the developing world. This 
would regard policy making at the national level and the production and protection of 
public goods for the benefit of mankind, for current as well as future generations.  
One should also re-examine the functioning of the international economic 
system, which should draw on the insights of “the new theories” and try to deal with the 
proliferation of bad equilibria, recurrent financial and currency crises, growing economic 
gaps, the deterioration of the environment, and conflicts in the world. Unless the 
production of international public goods takes place on a proper scale it would be hard 
to convince developing countries that the “disciplining” pressure of world markets is 
positive and in their interest.  
Institutional and policy diversity does have a meaning. 
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